Abstract Monitoring the progress of auctions for fraudulent bidding activities is crucial for detecting and stopping fraud during runtime to prevent fraudsters from succeeding. To this end, we introduce a stage-based framework to monitor multiple live auctions for In-Auction Fraud (IAF). Creating a stage fraud monitoring system is different than what has been previously proposed in the very limited studies on runtime IAF detection. More precisely, we launch the IAF monitoring operation at several time points in each running auction depending on its duration. At each auction time point, our framework first detects IAF by evaluating each bidder's stage activities based on the most reliable set of IAF patterns, and then takes appropriate actions to react to dishonest bidders. We develop the proposed framework with a dynamic agent architecture where multiple monitoring agents can be created and deleted with respect to the status of their corresponding auctions (initialized, completed or cancelled). The adoption of dynamic software architecture represents an excellent solution to the scalability and time efficiency issues of IAF monitoring systems since hundreds of live auctions are held simultaneously in commercial auction houses. Every time an auction is completed or terminated, the participants' fraud scores are updated dynamically. Our approach enables us to observe each bidder in each live auction and manage his fraud score as well. We validate the IAF monitoring service through commercial auction data. We conduct three experiments to detect and react to shill-bidding fraud by employing datasets acquired Samira Sadaoui sadaouis@uregina.ca 1 University of Regina, Regina, SK Canada from auctions of two valuable items, Palm PDA and XBOX. We observe each auction at three-time points, verifying the shill patterns that most likely happen in the corresponding stage for each one.
Introduction

Problem and motivations
Mainstream research has identified three major topics of interest regarding online auctioning: eliciting buyer preferences for multi-criteria auctions, determining the winners for various auction mechanisms, and detecting auction fraud. Each day, thousands of people bid in commercial auctions (mostly forward and price-only attribute). Despite the many advantages of online auctioning, there are also serious threats to users' interests. Online auctions attract a large number of fraudsters due to the huge volume of traffic on these sites [13, 33] . As mentioned in [7] , auction fraud remained in the top two reported cybercrime types since 2004. Moreover, the federal Internet Crime Complaint Centre (IC3) has reported that auction fraud accounted for an estimated $11 million in losses between June and December 2014 [16] . According to a 2013 IC3 report, 5 % of Internet complaints were related to automobile auction scams, which resulted in losses totaling $51 million in 2013, an increase of $43 million compared to 2011.
Online auctions provide many opportunities for misbehavior. There are risks for users both before and after the auctions, such as misrepresented and non-existent items, non-payment, and non-delivery of items. Additionally, fraudulent activities known as In-Auction Fraud (IAF) may occur during the bidding period [13] . Unlike pre-and postauction fraud, IAF, such as shill bidding, is hard to detect, and one serious concern is that the innocent bidders are not even aware that IAF is occurring. IAF can be conducted by both sellers and bidders. Dishonest users utilize various IAF strategies that have been identified in English forward auctions [11, 32] , including: 1) bid shilling i.e., inflating the price by placing false bids in order to generate interest for the item and persuade other participants to bid more; 2) bid shielding i.e., placing a high bid and then withdrawing it from the auction prior to the closing time in order to purchase the item with a lower price; 3) bid sniping i.e., submitting a bid in the final seconds of the auction to guarantee oneself to win the auction; 4) collusion between a seller and a bidder, or between bidders; 5) bid siphoning i.e., when a seller does not want to pay the fees to launch his own auction and instead watches an ongoing auction in order to propose a lower price to the winning bidder. By incorporating rules within the negotiation protocol, some IAF behavior can be prevented. For instance, shielding can be prevented by disallowing bidders from withdrawing bids, and sniping can be prevented by extending the auction duration. Nevertheless, other types of IAF, such as shill bidding and user collusion, must be monitored because they cannot be prevented in advance. Shill bidding has been recognized as one of the most prevalent cheating activities in online auctions, and also the hardest to detect [20, 21, 24, 30, 39] . In order to drive up the final price of an auctioned item, a seller may manipulate his auction, for example by bidding via phony identities (with fake accounts and IP addresses) [32] . The difference between the price of a fraudulent auction and the price of a normal auction is the seller's revenue [11] . Numerous empirical studies have demonstrated the presence of shill bidding by examining offline auction data from popular auction houses. For instance, [30, 39] analyzed bidding data from eBay, revealing the use of several shilling strategies. On the other hand, [11] discussed the negative impact of shill bidding on the markets.
Consequently, the detection of IAF in online auctions is crucial. From the literature, we categorize fraud detection solutions into two types: offline and runtime. Offline, or batch detection models, analyze an enormous number of historical auction transactions [10, 30] . Although batch analysis may find several IAF patterns, it remains a complicated task. Moreover, offline detection occurs too late as it is performed after the crime has occurred and honest buyers have already lost their money. Since the damage happens during the auction, it is necessary to detect and stop IAF during runtime to prevent fraudsters from succeeding. So far, all existing commercial auctions and most previous research works have not proposed services that detect and react to IAF in ongoing auctions.
Contributions
To increase trust in online auctions, it is essential to detect undesirable bidding activities before it is too late. As depicted in Fig. 1 , we introduce a stage-based framework to monitor IAF in multiple live auctions. More precisely, we launch the monitoring operation.
at several time points during the running auctions. We divide the monitoring functionality into two tasks: detecting IAF and reacting to IAF. The first task examines bidding activities at each auction time point based on the most reliable set of fraud patterns (stage-based), and the second determines how to react to illegal activities by taking actions to counter fraudsters and infected auctions. We quantify the IAF patterns with proper metrics and aggregate them with a fusing technique to produce a single value representing the live fraud score of each bidder in each ongoing auction. The proposed framework is novel since a stagebased IAF monitoring system has not been proposed in the existing literature. To the best of our knowledge, there are only three studies on runtime detection of IAF [13, 38, 39] but these studies have some limitations. In this article, we first improve the monitoring algorithms and shill-bidding metrics introduced in our previous work [27] . The following points highlight the contributions and merits of this present research.
• Stage-based IAF Monitoring: Our approach is different from those previously proposed in the very limited studies on runtime IAF detection. In those studies, the fraud detection task is performed after every submitted bid and every bid is evaluated against the same set of IAF patterns, which makes it very time consuming. Moreover, assigning an agent for each bidder is not practical in real life due to the very large number of bidders competing in commercial auctions. Our detection approach is carried out at auction certain time points and at a collection of bids, denoting a bidder's behavior at an auction stage. Our fraud score is more reliable because it is obtained by evaluating stage-based bids against stage-based IAF patterns. Thanks to this score, we are able to observe each bidder in each auction, and take actions in runtime; for example, issuing warnings to dishonest bidders and cancelling the fraudulent auction.
• IAF Score Management: Each time an auction is completed or canceled, we merge the live fraud score with the past fraud score to generate an overall value denoting the level of misconduct of each bidder in all the auctions they have participated in. Unlike past studies in which a bidder's fraud score continually increases, our method adjusts the bidder's fraud score as the auctions happen. This will allow us to obtain a relatively clear picture of each user's behavior in the auction system, and it will enable us to take appropriate additional action (like suspending a user's account). We assign users to clusters (normal, suspicious, or fraudulent) based on their current fraud scores, and these clusters, which are visible to all, can be used to deter users from committing IAF and misusing the auctions. Most auction houses, such as eBay, manage the reputation of users solely based on their feedback ratings, but ratings are not always indicative of a user's real reputation because they can be easily falsified and manipulated. We hold that IAF scores reflect more strongly a user's reputation.
• Dynamic Agent System Design: We develop the IAF monitoring framework as a dynamic multi-agent system where an agent is assigned to monitor each auction. A monitoring agent is added or removed from the system depending on whether the auction's status is initialized, completed, or terminated. Adaptive architectures represent an excellent solution to the scalability problem of IAF detection systems since hundreds of auctions are performed simultaneously in commercial auctions sites. Furthermore, the running time is not an issue because our system processes a smaller set of bids (stage-based) periodically as opposed to offline detection where a huge amount of historical data is evaluated at the same time. Hence, our monitoring approach is able to respond very quickly while bidders are still competing at the beginning of an auction stage.
• System Implementation and Validation: We implement our auction monitoring framework specifically for shill-bidding fraud by employing an agent simulation platform where asynchronous communication between agents and dynamic creation and deletion of agents are supported. We then validate the proposed shill monitoring service with real auction data from eBay. We conduct three experiments to detect and react to shill bidding based on datasets acquired from auctions of two valuable items, Palm PDA and XBOX. We examine the auctions at three time-points, and for each of them we verify the shill patterns that most likely happen in the corresponding stage.
Related works
Most of the studies on IAF detection focus on shill-bidding fraud. In the following sections, we first classify shillbidding strategies and then examine previous shill-detection mechanisms (offline vs. runtime). Afterwards, we report from the literature the difficulties of scraping data from commercial auction sites.
Shill bidding strategies
The goal of shill bidding is to increase the price of goods or services in order to generate interest for the auctioned items. Still, shill bidders avoid winning the auctions. To commit the fraud, the seller would enlist a confederate or would create an alternate account. Diverse shilling strategies have been identified and recognized in English forward auctions, for example six in [30] , three in [31] , five in [18] , nine in [32] , one in [12] , three in [15] , and eight in [10] . Some shill patterns appear more often in the auction data. We classify shill patterns into several groups. Below Shill Bidder (SB) represents a seller or an accomplice user.
• Security related: SB creates fake identities by using different accounts and IP addresses. • Buy-back shilling: SB wins the auction only to re-sell the item due to a low current auction price.
A shill-bidding pattern mostly occurs during a certain auction stage. [38] and [13] suggest three stages:
• Early stage i.e., in the first 25 % of the elapsed auction time. SB places bids early in the auction to encourage others to bid, especially when the participation rate is low.
• Middle stage i.e., from 25 % to 90 % of the auction duration. Most of the bidding activities happen in this stage.
• Last stage i.e., in the last 10 % of the auction time. SB submits very few bids. Bidding towards the end of an auction is very risky as the fraudster could accidentally win.
Shill bidding detection
Some prevention approaches have been adopted to try to deter auction users from committing fraud, such as requiring credit card information when registering [23] , or taking into account the users' reputation [38] . Even so, they are not enough against shill bidding. We split the IAF detection research into two parts: offline vs. runtime. Most of the shill detection processes are done offline. Indeed, very few studies have proposed runtime shill detection services.
Offline detection
There are two major drawbacks of offline detection approaches: the analysis of the tremendous amount of batch auction data is a very challenging task, and they cannot react to shill bidding since they take place after the fact that innocent bidders have been already cheated. In the literature, numerous offline detection models have been introduced. For instance, studies [30, 32] , and [9] define the measurements for a set of shill strategies and aggregate them to produce a final shill score. [38] formalizes and then verifies patterns of shill bidding by using a formal specification technique. [10] employs Dempster-Shafer theory to express shill patterns as pieces of evidence and combines them to provide the degree of belief as to whether or not a bidder may be a shill. Moreover, several supervised learning methods have been used for the offline detection of shill patterns. For example, [9] proposes an approach based on artificial neural networks to predict the final auction price according to the detected shill activities. Other papers utilize decision trees to classify bidders into either two groups-"Regular" and "Shill Bidder" [8, 40] -or into three groups-"Normal", "Suspicious", and "Highly Suspicious" [14] . Another study [41] applies genetic algorithms to detect optimally collusive behavior in auctions, while others develop detection methods based on Bayesian graphs to calculate the probability of whether or not a bidder is a shill [15, 22] .
Runtime detection
To the best of our knowledge, only three studies on runtime shill detection have been proposed [13, 38, 39] . In [39] , the authors develop an agent trust management framework for the real-time detection of shill activities. Five labels (from most trusted to most untrusted) are assigned to users according to their reputation and shill scores in the auction system. Yet the presented reputation, which depends on the feedback ratings, is not always indicative of a user's real reputation. Two actions can be taken in case of detected fraud: warning suspicious bidders and cancelling the infected auction. In this paper, an agent is assigned to monitor each bidder; however, this is not practical in real life due to the huge number of users competing in multiple live auctions. In [38] , Xu et al. introduce a formal approach for detecting shill bidding by assigning an agent to each bidder. This approach employed three sources: the auction model, which is updated dynamically as new bids arrive; Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulas representing the shill patterns; and a SPIN model checker that verifies whether or not the LTL formulas are violated. Nevertheless, monitoring an auction after every submitted bid (the real-time event) may make the detection task inefficient. A bidder's shill score keeps increasing every time a fraud pattern is detected. Furthermore, seven of the nine shill patterns are related to the reserve price, and one pattern to the estimated price. These patterns are not suitable in practice since the reverse price is not disclosed in commercial auctions, and estimating the price is not always possible for certain types of items like antiques. Another interesting paper [13] presents a neural network-based detection approach that classifies bidders into two groups: "Normal" and "Suspicious". The classifier is first initialized with a labeled training dataset, and then updated incrementally after each submitted bid. Some of the difficult tasks addressed by this study are labeling manually the bidders in the clusters (generated by a data clustering technique), and regularly adjusting the tuning parameters.
Auction data scraping
Actual and simulated data have been used to validate the detection systems of shill bidding. Original auction data, representing the real behavior of users, are important in order to perform a robust and valid empirical assessment. Several studies extracted data from commercial auctions (like eBay, TradeMe and Yahoo Taiwan) where the bid history can be accessed. They developed Web scrapers that depend on the structure of the examined auction websites [2, 42] . Web scrapers extract raw data from Web pages and then convert them into usable information. Sometimes, the list of fraudsters, if known, is employed as a starting point for the Web crawlers [7] . But in eBay this list is not disclosed because of the privacy issue.
On the other hand, data scraping is a very tedious operation as demonstrated in some research papers. The tremendous volume of data in auction sites makes data crawling very difficult [42] , and obtaining big data is a complicated task [2, 34] . Additionally, filtering the overwhelming amount of offline auction data is costly. In [26] the authors claimed that 80 % of resources are used to pre-process the authentic auction data. To improve the timeefficiency, very few studies developed multiple concurrent crawler agents, and a queuing technique to avoid redundant crawling [2, 42] . Even though, [2] scraped only 1300 auctions and 800,000 transactions from eBay after a period of one month, and [42] extracted only 7682 auction pages from eBay after a period of 8 hours. Also, we would like to mention that some commercial auctions forbid data crawling from their sites. As stated in eBay policies, the use of crawlers to access its data is not allowed. Another issue is that auction sites delete data after a certain time period because of data storage problem. For example in eBay, this period is between 2 to 3 months depending on the category of items. Therefore, IAF patterns will be evaluated within this period.
A dynamic IAF monitoring framework
This section exposes the top-level structure of the entire In-Auction Fraud Monitoring framework that we design as dynamic Multi-Agent System (MAS). MASs yield to significant benefits [29] , including: 1) easier management of the system complexity by decomposing a challenging problem into sub-problems assigned to different agents; 2) efficient computation when utilizing asynchronous message passing between agents, and therefore concurrent operations may be realized; 3) great system flexibility since agents may be added or removed easily from the society thanks to their autonomy.
Framework architecture
The entire auction framework is organized with three independent layers as depicted in Fig. 2 . The user interface layer is responsible of the interaction duties with the end users, like auction and user registration, bid placement and information display. The application layer is a MAS composed of two fixed agents (AuctionController and ClusterUpdating) and multiple dynamic IAF monitoring agents. The dynamic creation and deletion of monitoring agents, extraction and storage of auction and user data, inspection of bidding activities, reaction to fraud, and revision of users' fraud scores are all performed in this layer. The data layer stores information about users, live and past auctions. The main advantage of the 3-layer architectural style is easiness in maintaining each layer independently from others. In real life, this architecture can be deployed on several tiers: the auction website that we want to monitor, the database server, and the monitoring agents may be distributed on several servers to increase the system scalability since in practice hundreds of live auctions operate in parallel.
We propose controller-based MAS for the runtime monitoring of IAF. The controller agent acts as a medium of the whole auction system and performs simultaneously several important operations: collecting auction data from multiple live auctions, creating multiple monitoring agents and assuring the concurrent communication with them. We describe below the workflow of the monitoring framework and the interaction between agents:
• Dynamic creation of monitoring agents: Before an auction starts, all its information should first be initialized, such as the category, description, starting and reserve prices of the item as well as the starting time, duration and bid increment rule of the auction. 
A dynamic MAS
As mentioned in [37] , agents may enjoy the following characteristics: 1) Autonomy i.e., agents perform actions based on their own knowledge and without any external intervention; 2) Pro-activity i.e., agents take the initiative to adjust themselves to accomplish the predefined goals; 3) Reactivity i.e., agents respond to the changes in their environments by taking suitable decisions; 4) Collaboration or social ability i.e., agents communicate and coordinate with each other, typically by passing messages. Additionally, agents may be super agents i.e., they are built with more capabilities (like greater CPU power, more storage capacity and higher network bandwidth) in order to perform huge workload [35] . Table 1 shows the features of the three types of agents in the IAF monitoring framework. We consider AuctionController and ClusterUpdating as super agents with high processing power and network bandwidth because they interact concurrently with a large number of remote auctions and monitoring agents. Since ClusterUpdating is triggered by another agent, it does not have the autonomy and pro-activity features. We develop our IAF monitoring framework as dynamic MAS to be able to create and delete multiple monitoring agents and without disturbing other agents [28] . An adaptive configuration is an excellent approach to handle the scalability issue since in practice hundreds of auctions run in parallel. However, dynamic architectures need extra services to support them. When agents join and leave unpredictably the society, the agent location mechanisms are required in both centralized and decentralized architectures. In other words, some agents in our MAS need to know the addresses of the agents they communicate with.
We choose the centralized middle-agent approach proposed by [36] to organize our IAF monitoring framework and make it easier to modify. An agent may have a contact list of the agents it interacts with, and this list may be changed dynamically. AuctionController, a middle agent, enables interactions with the dynamic end-agents by storing their location information in the MAS. As presented in Fig. 3 , AuctionController knows the addresses of the dynamic monitoring agents and the fixed agent ClusterUpdating as well. When a new monitoring agent is created, its contact list is initialized with the location information of the two fixed super-agents. Also, the new location will be added to the contact list of AuctionController. With respect to ClusterUpdating agent, there is no need to equip it with a contact list. When a monitoring agent leaves the MAS, AuctionController deletes it from its list. The advantages of our design are twofold: the dynamic location mechanism is 4 Stage-based IAF monitoring
Monitoring a live auction
To increase trust in online auctions, every live auction should be systematically monitored at different times. These time points are defined by the developer and depend on the auction duration and IAF types. AuctionMonitoring comprises of two internal agents as illustrated in Fig. 4 . At each time point, AuctionMonitoring initiates sequentially its sub-agents, and then watts until the next time point is reached. When an auction is completed or cancelled, AuctionMonitoring calls asynchronously ClusterUpdating agent to generate the bidders' new fraud scores. Subsequently, AuctionMonitoring automatically deletes itself from the MAS. This will help to release the MAS resources and keep it working more efficiently. The runtime fraud monitoring of one live auction is given in Algorithm 1, which is performed by each monitoring agent. This algorithm employs three logs: 1) live-auction log contains various information, such as auction ID, seller ID, product ID, starting time, duration, starting and reserve prices, submitted bids of each participant, and his current live fraud score; 2) when an auction is completed or terminated, all its information are transferred from the live-auction log to the past-auction log by including new data, like the final auction price, total bids for each auction stage, auction status (Successful or Unsuccessful), and the winner ID in case the auction was successfully completed; 3) the fraud pattern log records the IAF metrics, Fig. 4 Monitoring Agent of a Live Auction their corresponding auction time points and thresholds. In the future, to take into account new IAF patterns, we just add their metrics into this log.
Runtime detection of IAF
We observe each bidder in each auction as he may misbehave in just some particular auctions. In addition to bid properties, we also consider properties from users and auctions to ensure better detection results. Each IAF pattern is most likely to occur in a certain auction stage. The IAF detection algorithm below evaluates a stage-based set of IAF patterns w. r. t. the history of the bidder being examined and the auction being monitored. We first quantify the fraud patterns with proper metrics, and then aggregate them with a fusing method, such as the weighted mathematical average. Indeed, we can associate weights to the IAF patterns to denote their relative importance by considering their auction stages. The aggregation goal is to produce an overall value, called Live Fraud Score (LFS), which measures the level of fraud of each bidder in each running auction. This score is updated at each auction time point by incorporating the set of fraud metrics of the corresponding stage.
Runtime reaction to IAF
As presented in Algorithm 3, the fraud reaction agent reacts to a bidder's behavior upon the value of his current live fraud score. If this score is in a certain range or beyond it, this agent performs immediately the following actions (three types) against dishonest bidders and IAF-infected auction:
• Warn suspicious bidders: this agent sends a warning message to AuctionController about suspicious bidders in the live auction. AuctionController warns each suspected bidder to compete more responsibly in the auction.
• Cancel an auction: If serious cheating activities occurred in an auction stage, the agent sends a cancellation message to AuctionController to terminate the infected auction. It also updates the liveAuctionLog with the new auction status i.e., "unsuccessful".
• Blame fraudulent bidders: For all high fraud scores, AuctionController on behalf of AuctionMonitoring contacts the fraudulent bidders and blames them for the auction termination.
We may note that in the same auction, we may detect suspicious and fraudulent bidders. In Algorithm 3, the developer defines the two thresholds.
Users' cluster updating
When an auction ends, successfully or not, the live fraud score of each participant is merged with his fraud score of past auctions, and his cluster is updated accordingly (see Algorithm 4). Hence, we obtain an overall value representing the fraud score of a user for all the participated auctions. It is useful to assign to each user a label regarding his level of conduct: "normal", "suspicious" or "fraudulent". In this way, we will have a very good idea about each user's behavior in the auction house. The cluster of each user is displayed to all to see, and could represent his reputation. A new user will have a status of "normal". Only normal and suspicious users can compete in new auctions. The accounts of fraudsters are suspended permanently.
Monitoring live auctions for shill bidding
In this article, we are interested in monitoring auctions for shill bidding. Hence, in this section, we first expose the stage-based shill bidding patterns and their metrics. Then we explain how to combine the metrics to produce the live fraud score at each auction stage.
Stage-based shill patterns
Many shilling strategies have been identified in past studies. Below we compiled 17 shill-bidding patterns from [30, 31, 18, 12, 38, 15, 10] . We consider properties from three sources: user, auction and bid. Patterns #1, #10 and #12 are properties of users; #15, #16 and #17 of auctions, and the rest is for the submitted bids at auction stages. We monitor shill bidding at three time points: at 25 % (early stage), at 90 % (middle stage) and at 100 % (final stage) of the auction duration. In the following, we determine for each of them the shill patterns that most probably occur in the corresponding stage.
Early Stage [T start , T early ]:
1. SB participates exclusively in auctions conducted by some sellers. A normal bidder usually negotiates in several concurrent auctions to find the best price, but SB deals with a limited range of sellers (Bidder Tendency). Concurrent auctions mean that they sell identical items. 2. SB places bids very close to the auction starting time (Early Bidding). 3. SB submits a bid that is very close to the reserve price. 4. SB posts small bid increments with the minimum amount required by the auction.
Middle Stage [T early , T middle ]:
5. SB outbids legitimate bids until he is satisfied or he has reached the reserve price (Bidding Ratio). 6. SB often bids successively to outbid oneself even when he is the current winner (Successive Outbidding). 7. Successive outbidding or bidding ratio is high when the current auction price is smaller than the reserve price; otherwise they are lower to reduce the risk of winning (Reserve Price Shilling). Reserve price is hidden from bidders. 8. SB submits a bid within a short time interval (1 minute) of any new legitimate bids. 9. SB outbids any bid with a minimum of 10% to 20% of the current bidding price. 10. SB participates in the concurrent auctions with higher bidding prices rather than with lower prices.
Final Stage [T middle , T final ]:
11. SB stops negotiating early before the auction ends i.e., avoids sniping (Last Bidding). 12. The winner ratio of SB is very low even though he competed aggressively (Winning Ratio). 13. SB bids less for high or medium value items. 14. SB submits low bid increment with the minimum amount required by the auction. 15. An auction with shills has more bids that the average number of bids in concurrent auctions (Auction Bids). 16. The starting price of IAF-infected auction is less than the average staring price of concurrent auctions. 17. When the auction price is significantly higher than the expected price, there is a probability of 66.7% of the auction being infected [10] .
Shill metrics
We define here the metrics for eight shill patterns because these patterns are usually viewed as strong signs of fraud. The metrics are calculated from the live auction being monitored and also from all the past auctions (covering a certain period of time; for instance the last 3 months). The higher the metric value, the more suspicious is the bidder being examined. Below U denotes a bidder competing in a live auction A initiated by seller S.
• Bidder Tendency:
if (|auctionP art (U )| > 1) then bidderT endency(U, S) = |auctionSellerP art (U, S)| |auctionP art (U )| else bidderT endency (U, S)
where the dividend is the number of auctions that user U has participated in for seller S in a given time period; the divisor is the number of auctions that user U has joined during the same period. The condition is necessary to discard those bidders who competed in only one auction for the same period.
• Early Bidding:
where firstTimeBid is evaluated from the stage T start , T early
• Bidding Ratio:
biddingRatio (U, A) = totalBidU ser(U, A) totalBids(A)
For both operands, the number of bids should be collected only from the interval T early , T middle ] .
• Successive Outbidding:
If user U successively outbided three times or two times in the middle stage T early , T middle ] , the value of this fraud pattern is 1 or 0.5 respectively. Otherwise, the value equals 0.
• Reserve Price Shilling: • Last Bidding [38] :
where lastBidTime is assessed only from the stage T middle , T f inal .
• Winning Ratio:
The dividend is the number of auctions won by user U in a given time period; the divisor is the number of auctions joined by user U for the same period and in these auctions U has a bidding ratio that is more than 5 % of the total bids. This will eliminate the issue of non-active bidders. Here biddingRatio is calculated from the whole auction interval, i.e., T start , T f inal .
• Auction Bids:
if (concurrentAverageBids (A) < totalBids (A)) then auctionBids (A) = 1 − concurrenAverageBids (A) totalBids (A) else auctionBids (A)
where concurrentAverageBids represents the average number of bids of the concurrent auctions to auction A (in a certain time period), and totalBids is produced from the whole auction A i.e., T start , T f inal .
We now illustrate some of these metrics with a concrete auction scenario. We assume that a bidder U is currently competing in a live auction initiated by seller S. According to this user history, in the last 3 months, he participated in 50 auctions, and won 3 times only. Also, user U participated only 3 times for the auctions held by seller S. Therefore, the tendency of this user for this seller would be 3/50 = 0.06, which is very low to suspect any collusion between these two users. However, the winning ratio of this bidder is equal to 1 -3/50 = 0.94. This value indicates that this user maybe a shill bidder as he rarely won in the past auctions even though he was an active bidder. Moreover, in the middle auction stage, the total number of submitted bids is 25, and bidder U placed 10 bids. So, his bidding ratio is equal to 10/25 = 0.4, which is low to arouse any suspicion. However, in this same stage, U placed 3 bids without other bidders outbidding him. Then the value of successive outbidding would be 1, which is very high. To be able to take action, we need first to combine all these metrics to produce a single fraud score as explained in the following section.
Stage-based shill detection
Several works have assigned manually weights to their shill bidding patterns [3, 11, 14] . We follow the same approach as explained below (see Table 2 ): • The IAF patterns in the early stage have the lowest weights because we need more fraud signs to take actions. In particular, Bidder Tendency pattern has a low weight due to the false tendency issue i.e., a bidder has a tendency for a certain seller due to his good reputation, or he is the only one selling the item [30] .
• In the middle stage, the corresponding IAF patterns have the highest weights because they are a good indicator of shilling (a shill bidder bids aggressively in this stage). Still, we have some exceptions. The reserve price shilling has a low weight because in commercial auctions, the reserve price is not disclosed. In our experiments, we generated artificially the values of this attribute.
• At the final stage, the IAF patterns have medium weights. However, since the Winning Ratio represents the behavior of a user in all the past auctions, thus we give it a high weight. Also, we assign a low weight to Auction Bids because it is a property of auctions.
In Table 3 , we show how to compute the live fraud score for each bidder in each stage in an ongoing auction. This score is updated incrementally by including the fraud metrics of the next auction stage. This updating is based on the weighted mathematical average.
System implementation
We developed our auction fraud monitoring service with the Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) model [25] . Each agent, AuctionController, AuctionMonitoring and ClusterUpdating, has a set of beliefs (agent's knowledge about itself and its environment), goals (the desires an agent intends to achieve), and plans (the assigned tasks an agent performs). For the purpose of software simulation, we adopted the agent platform Jadex [3] that utilizes the BDI model as the reasoning engine as well as the FIPA-ACL as the agent interaction protocol. We employ the latest version Jadex BDI V3, and also two integrated development tools Eclipse IDE 4.4.1 and Java SE Runtime Environment 8u51. As for the database, we chose MySQL Community Server. Within Jadex, we implement all the agents in Java, including beliefs, plans, and goals. Jadex supports the asynchronous communication through the public Java interface "Ifuture". Moreover, the annotation "@Agent" and the class "BDIAgent" are provided for creating agent dynamically. To remove an agent from the society, we apply the public function "agentKilled()" of the interface "IMicroAgent". In this article, we specifically implement our IAF monitoring system to detect and react to the shill bidding strategies exposed in Section 5. Figure 5 illustrates the Jadex Control Center, Java Tables and the fraud detection results of one of the experiments conducted in Section 7. We implement in total 9 plans and 15 classes. As we can see in Fig. 6 , AuctionController is equipped with three plans, AuctionMonitoring with five, and ClusterUpdating with one.
System validation
We conduct three experiments to assess the effectiveness of our IAF monitoring system based on actual data from the commercial auction house eBay. 
Real auction datasets
Actual auction data have been made available in the following link: http://www.modelingonlineauctions.com/datasets [17] . This website contains the auction listings (English, forward, and one unit of an item) of three high valued items auctioned in eBay: XBOX game consoles, Cartier wristwatches, and Palm Pilot PDAs. For our experiments, we use the PDA and XBOX auctions for the following reasons. These two items were in high demand as they attracted a large number of bidders and bids. Also, as mentioned in eBay website, today XBOX is in the top 2 of the most sold categories (among 34), and PDA in the top 12. Additionally, since these items have good price ranges, they may have attracted fraudsters. Indeed, more the item price is high, more there is a possibility of shill bidding activities [9] . The PDA and XBOX auctions were collected over a period of two months but in different years, 2003 and 2007 respectively. Table 4 exposes the features of PDA and XBOX auctions, and Table 5 some statistical information. In Table 5 , "1-time bidder" means that he participated in only one auction, and "2-time bidder" in only two auctions. We may note that the reserve price is not accessible in eBay. Since this feature is required to compute the metric of the reserve-price shilling pattern, we therefore add it artificially into all the auctions (a total of 242). We produce the reserve price for each auction according to its final price. Usually, on average, there is a difference of 15 % between the final price and the reserve price [4] . It worth noting that several studies included crafted data to evaluate their proposed systems for online auctions; for instance reputation management [19] and shill bidding detection [33] .
Since the duration of the auctions is 7 days, therefore, the early stage takes 1 day and 18 hours, the middle stage 4 days and 13.2 hours, and the final stage 16.8 hours. Also, we set the thresholds MedRange to [0.5, 0.7) and HighRange to [0.7, 1.0].
Examining PDA auctions
Since shill bidding happens in auctions with more bids, we therefore analyze the top two auctions that have the highest Fig. 7 , the first top auction has 51 bids and the second top 41. Hence, we consider these 2 top auctions as the live auctions, and the 147 remaining auctions as past auctions. We can see in Fig. 8 that most of the sellers held less than 5 auctions, but there is one particular seller (user ID of "s***l") who held the highest number of auctions (40 in the span of two months). It is this same seller who launched the top two auctions. To protect the privacy of users, we return the user ID by keeping only the first and last characters. Table 6 presents detailed information about the first top auction where "1-time bid" means the percentage of bidders who placed only one bid in this auction, and "2-time bid" only two bids. Figure 9 gives the live fraud scores of each bidder in each stage. Some bidders only have one fraud score because of no bids placed by them in the other stages. For example, since user "a***4" only participated in the last stage, therefore the live fraud scores of the first two stages are zero. Fortunately, in this auction, only one bidder, "z***n", performed abnormally. In the middle stage, this user has a bidding percentage of 32 %, and he also outbided himself twice: one time with four consecutive bids and another time with two. In our point of view, this bidder competed in this way because his submitted bid amounts (the last bid was $157.5 in the middle stage) were still less than the reserve price of $193.38. Since his live fraud score is 0.5424, he will only receive a warning at the end of the middle stage to bid carefully for the rest of the auction. Table 7 exposes the information of the second top auction, and Fig. 10 the live fraud score of each bidder in each stage of this auction. According to Fig. 10 , we have one suspicious (m***m) and two fraudulent bidders (t***6 and k***0). So, in Table 8 , we analyze in detail the bidding activities of these three bidders to confirm their shill bidding behavior. In the early stage, the two users "t***6" and "k***0" submitted bids at the very beginning to attract more bidders, and both bided for only one seller among 71 sellers. Regarding the bidder "m***m", he competed a lot in the middle stage, and in the final stage he stopped bidding very early. Besides he never won any auction in the 147 past auctions. These bidding activities are strong signs of fraud. We also compute the percentage of bidders who committed each shill-bidding pattern in this auction. As an example, the bidder percentage for early bidding is 18.2 %, for bidding ratio in the middle stage is 43.2 %, and for last bidding is 38.6 %.
First top auction
Second top auction
The following actions should have been taken because of serious shill bidding activities. Since there is a presence of two bidders with very high IAF scores, this auction should have been terminated at the end of the early stage i.e., at 1 day and 18 hours In other words, the cancellation would have saved a lot of time (5 days and 6 hours) for honest bidders. In addition, the two users t***6 and k***0 should be blamed for the auction cancellation.
Examining XBOX auctions
In the XBOX auction dataset, the seller IDs are missing. However, it is needed to measure the buyer tendency Middle Stage m***r
• Around 75 % of bids are placed by this user in this stage, which is extremely high (Bidding Ratio).
• He aggressively placed bids with a 100 % successive outbidding: in one time 9 consecutive bids and in another time 5 ones (Successive Outbidding).
• His last bid of $105 was still less than the reserve price of metric. According to the PDA dataset, the ratio of total auctions to total bidders is 149:71. To keep the same ratio, we generated 44 sellers as depicted in Fig. 11 . The figure shows the number of auctions hosted by each seller. Since shill bidding happens in auctions with more bids, we would like to analyze the auction with the highest number of bids (which is 75 bids). Table 9 exposes the statistical information of the largest XBOX auction initiated by seller "038". Similarly to the previous experiments, the live fraud scores of each participant in each stage as shown in Fig. 12 . We have one suspicious bidder, "b***8" at the early stage, and one fraudulent bidder, "m***r", at the middle stage. Subsequently, we examine their bidding activities to confirm the fraud (see Table 10 ). In this auction, user "b***8" is sent a warning to act more responsibly for the next two stages. Also, this XBOX auction should have been terminated at the end of the middle stage, and the fraudster "m***r" blamed for the termination.
Discussion
In the PDA dataset, the user "s***l" held 26.8 % of auctions in the small interval of 19 days. Also, his top two PDA auctions were seriously infected with shill bidding. These two auctions should have been cancelled. The auctions of this seller attracted 372 out of 1024 bidders, and among these 372 bidders, 84.1 % participated only for this seller. After examination, we have found out that 17.2 % of bidders who competed for this user have a feedback rating equal to zero. There is a possibility that some of these bidder's accounts are fake ones. For all these reasons, seller "s***l" is a highly suspicious user. This information can be transmitted to eBay for further investigation.
Conclusions and future work
Research into fraud detection is becoming crucial to building greater trust in e-commerce applications. Online auctions are still not trustworthy due to the lack of runtime fraud monitoring services. This lack allows auction users to fake their identities and behave as they desire. Developing a stage-based fraud-monitoring service is different than what has been presented in the very few studies on runtime IAF detection. The proposed runtime stage-based monitoring system first detects IAF by examining each bidder's stage activities against reliable IAF patterns. After detecting abnormal activities in ongoing auctions, our system takes immediate action by warning dishonest bidders and cancelling the IAF-infected auctions. Each bidder has a live fraud score as well as an overall fraud score which respectively denote their current misconduct in a live auction and in all prior auctions they have participated in. By managing the fraud scores of auction users, our system may take additional action like suspending fraudsters' accounts. We have designed our fraud monitoring system with an adaptive agent architecture in order to address scalability and time efficiency issues since in real life hundreds of auctions are conducted concurrently on commercial auction sites. Our system can simultaneously monitor a very large number of live auctions. Every time an auction is completed or terminated, the corresponding monitoring agent is deleted in order to release resources for the other agents in the MAS. By using real datasets, we performed a detailed analysis of two Palm PDA auctions and one XBOX auction conducted in different years. We detected malicious bidders (suspicious and fraudulent) in all three auctions. Only one auction should have been successful. Indeed, one of the PDA auctions and the XBOX auction should have been cancelled in early stages. This cancelation action would save honest bidders money and also a lot of time, especially in auctions that last several days (up to 10 days).
Our study presents several interesting research directions, including:
• Incremental IAF detection: The proposed IAF detection approach-which is based on predefined IAF patterns-leads to good detection accuracy, but cannot discover new illegal bidding activities. Fraudsters' strategies are always evolving to foil the detection techniques [13, 32] . Consequently, automated learning is needed to adapt to new auction threats. One option to detect new threats is with outliers representing unusual behavior that differs from the expected one. The future work will investigate, in one hand, outlier detection in auction data, and on the other hand incremental learning [6] so that the IAF detection system can adjust continuously to new fraudulent strategies.
• Optimizing shill pattern weights: Instead of manually assigning weights to shill-bidding patterns, we want to utilize a machine-learning method to search reliably for the optimal weights. For instance, [32] applied the artificial neural networks to return the optimal weights by regulating every single weight until the best performance was found.
• Managing auction user's trust: We may view e-auctions as trust-critical open systems since malicious users can join and leave at any time. For this reason, it is necessary to manage the trust of users in the auction system. To this end, we will utilize important factors to evaluate trust, such as IAF, pre-and post-auction fraud, and user reputation. However for a reliable reputation, we will consider the certified reputation proposed for the context of competitive environments [5] like online auctions. In addition, we would like to employ the trust management framework ROSTAM [1] , which allows us to include an unlimited number of trust factors from different sources and aggregate them into a single value. The higher this value, the more untrustworthy (fraudulent) is the user.
